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JONATHAN EDWARDS AND
THE SENSE OF THE HEART
William Wainwright

This paper examines Edwards' attempt to make philosophical and theological sense of the
regenerate person's new sense of the spiritual beauty of divine things. It is divided into six
sections. The first two discuss the nature of the idea of spiritual beauty and Edwards'
reasons for thinking that our apprehension of it is a kind of sensation or perception. The
third explores the implications of Edwards' theory for the epistemic status of religious
belief while the fourth and fifth examine his defense of the objectivity of the new "spiritual
sense." The last section discusses the bearing of Edwards' remarks on current discussions.

Jonathan Edwards is well known for his insistence upon a "practical" or "experimental" religion that engages the human heart. At the core of the religion of the
heart is a sense of God's excellence and loveliness, or of the beauty and splendor
of divine things.
The savingly converted enjoy "gracious discoveries" of "God, in some of his
sweet and glorious attributes manifested in the gospel, and shining forth in the face
of Christ"-for example, "the all-sufficiency of the mercy and grace of God" or
"the infinite power of God, and his ability to save them ... " "In some, the truth
and certainty of the Gospel in general is the first joyful discovery they have . . ."
"More frequently Christ is distinctly made the object of the mind, in his all-sufficiency and willingness to save sinners . . ." (FN 171). I Recalling his own
conversion Edwards says
The first instance that I remember of that sort of inward, sweet delight in
God and divine things that I have lived much in since, was on reading
those words, I Tim. i. 17. Now unto the King eternal, immortal, invisible,
the only wise God, be honor and glory for ever and ever, Amen. As I read
the words, there came into my soul, and was as it were diffused through
it, a sense of the glory of the Divine Being; a new sense, quite different
from any thing I ever experienced before. Never any words of scripture
seemed to me as these words did. I thought with myself, how excellent a
Being that was, and how happy I should be, if I might enjoy that God,
and be rapt up to him in heaven, and be as it were swallowed up in him
for ever! (PN 59)
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Again, Edwards tells us, "I remember the thoughts I used then to have of
holiness ... It appeared to me, that there was nothing in it but what was ravishingly lovely; the highest beauty and amiableness ... a divine beauty; far purer
than anything here upon earth ... " (PN 63). "God," he says, "has appeared to
me a glorious and lovely Being, chiefly on account of his holiness .... The
doctrines of God's absolute sovereignty, and free grace, in showing mercy to
whom he would show mercy; and man's absolute dependence on the operations
of God's Holy Spirit, have very often appeared to me as sweet and glorious
doctrines. These doctrines have been much my delight" (PN 67).
Some express their new experiences by the terms "sight or discovery," others
by "a lively or feeling sense of heart" (FN 171-2). Both expressions refer to a
new understanding of spiritual notions. Those who have these experiences find
that phrases like "a spiritual sight of Christ," "faith in Christ," "poverty of spirit,"
etc., had not previously conveyed "those special and distinct ideas to their minds
which they were intended to signify; in some respects no more than the names
of colors are to convey the ideas to one that is blind from birth" (FN 174). But
now "things of religion" seem "new to them. . . preaching is a new
thing ... the bible is a new book ... " (FN 181). Indeed, "the light and comfort
which some of them enjoy ... causes all things about 'em to appear as it were
beautiful, sweet and pleasant to them: all things abroad, the sun, moon and stars,
the clouds and sky, the heavens and earth, appear as it were with a cast of divine
glory and sweetness upon them" (FN 183).
This paper examines Edwards' attempt to make philosophical and theological
sense of these experiences. It is divided into six sections. The first two discuss
the nature of the idea of spiritual beauty and Edwards' reasons for thinking that
our apprehension of beauty is a kind of sensation or perception. The third explores
the implications of Edwards' theory for the epistemic status of religious belief
while the fourth and fifth examine his defense of the objectivity of the new
"spiritual sense." The last section discusses the bearing of Edwards' remarks on
current discussions.
I.
The objects of a sense or feeling of the heart are (1) "actual [i.e., lively, clear
and distinct] ideas" (2) of things pertaining to the will or affections, (3) that
involve a "feeling of sweetness or pleasure, or of bitterness or pains . . . ." They
include (the ideas of') (1) "beauty and deformity," "good or evil," as well as
"excellency," "value," "importance" and their opposites, (2) delight and pleasure,
and pain and misery, (3) affective and conative attitudes, dispositions, and states,
e.g., "desires and longings, esteem ... hope, fear, contempt, choosing, refusing ... loving, hating, anger," (4) "dignity," "terrible greatness, or awful
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majesty," "meanness or contemptibleness," etc., and (5) the non-evaluative
characteristics upon which beauty and deformity, pleasure and pain, and attributes
like dignity or majesty depend. 3 The object of a sense or feeling of the heart is,
in essence, natural or spiritual good and evil, and what pertains to it. A sense
of the heart involves pleasure or displeasure, a sense of things with respect to
the good or evil in them. Natural good or evil is "good or evil which is agreeable
or disagreeable to human nature as such ... " Spiritual good or evil is what is
agreeable or disagreeable to people with "spiritual frames," i.e., to those who,
because the Spirit dwells within them, love being in general (i.e., God and the
beings that derive from Him and reflect Him) (Misc. 782, T 113-26).
The "immediate object of this spiritual sense" is "the beauty of holiness (RA
260), "the spiritual excellency, beauty, or sweetness of divine things" (Misc.
782), "true moral or spiritual beauty" (TV II), "the highest and primary beauty"
(TV 27)-a "new simple idea" that can't be produced by "exalting, varying or
compounding of that kind of perceptions or sensations which the mind had
before" (RA 205).
What kind of idea is this? Or, put this another way, what does Edwards mean
by "(true) beauty?" His remarks are open to at least three interpretations-that
(1) "beauty" refers to the delight or pleasure which holy things evoke in people
with spiritual "frames" or "tempers," that (2) beauty is a dispositional property,
viz., the tendency of holy things to produce this pleasure or delight in the
converted, and that (3) "beauty" designates a love to being in general, i.e., the
consent of being to being in which holiness consists.
There is some evidence that Edwards held the first or second view. He asserts,
for example, that "That form or quality is called beautiful, which appears in
itself agreeable or comely, or the view of which is immediately pleasant to the
mind . . . this agreeableness or gratefulness of the idea is beauty . . . we come
by the idea of beauty. . . by immediate sensation of the gratefulness of the idea
[thing] called beautiful ... " (TV 98). In "The Mind" 1 (332) Edwards assimilates
beauty and excellence, and then says, "We would know, why proportion is more
excellent than disproportion, that is, why proportion is pleasant to the mind and
disproportion unpleasant." Passages like these imply that beauty is some kind
of pleasure or agreeableness,4 or a tendency to produce it in appropriate circumstances.
We probably shouldn't attribute the second (dispositional) view to Edwards.
If "(true) beauty" referred to the tendency to produce a unique sort of delight in
those with spiritual frames, the idea of beauty would be a complex idea or "mixed
mode." This conflicts with the claim that spiritual beauty is a new simple idea
(RA 205).5
There are also problems in attributing the first view to Edwards. The philosophers who most influenced Edwards (Locke and the Cartesians) explicitly denied
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that ideas of pleasure and pain tell us anything about the nature of the objects
that produce them. 6 The idea of true beauty does. Edwards thinks that the new
"inward sense" agrees "with the necessary nature of things" and is appropriately
"called by the name of light, knowledge, understanding, etc." He repudiates the
suggestion that "the idea we obtain by this spiritual sense could in no respect
be said to be a knowledge or perception of anything besides what was in our
own minds," or that it is "no representation of anything without." On the contrary,
the idea of spiritual beauty is "the representation of the moral perfection and
excellency, of which we could have no true idea without it" (TV 99, 102-3).7
A more compelling reason for doubting that Edwards identified beauty with
pleasure (or a tendency to produce it) is that he so often speaks as if it were an
objective property of the things that have it. One of Edwards' central theses is
that God's nature and activity are overwhelmingly beautiful, and that the spiritual
and natural beauty of creatures is a reflection of, or participation in, God's own
beauty. The tenor of the passages that express these claims seems inconsistent
with the suggestion that beauty is simply a sensation which holy things produce
in the suitably disposed (or a power to produce it). Edwards was strongly influenced by Locke and other empiricists. But he also belongs to a Puritan tradition
that contains an important Platonic strand. 8 It may therefore be significant that
Platonism thinks of beauty as an objective property.
Finally, a number of texts appear to identify beauty with the consent of being
to being. This, too, seems inconsistent with the notion that beauty is some sort
of pleasure or delight.
In "The Mind" 1, for example, Edwards assimilates beauty and excellency
and then says "Excellency ... seems to consist in equality" (322, my italics).
Or again, "excellency consists in the similarities of one being to another-not
merely equality and proportion, but any kind of similamess ... This is an
universal definition of excellency: The consent of being to being, or being's
consent to entity" (336, my italics). Edwards continues to speak this way in later
works. In Religious Affections, he says "The true beauty and loveliness of all
intelligent beings does primarily and most essentially consist in their moral
excellency or holiness," i.e., in their benevolence or love of being in general.
"Holiness is ... the beauty of the divine nature" (RA 257, my italics. Cf.
285f.). In The Nature of True Virtue, he asserts 'This secondary ground of
virtuous love [viz., "pure benevolence to being in general"] is the thing wherein
true moral or spiritual beauty primarily consists. Yea, spiritual beauty consists
wholly in this and in" what proceeds from it (TV 11, my italics). "That consent,
agreement, or union of being to being . . . may be called the highest and primary
beauty ... [although] there is another, inferior, secondary beauty, which is
some image of this ... which consists in a mutual consent and agreement of
different things, in form, manner, quantity, and visible end or design; called by
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the various names of regularity, order, uniformity, symmetry, proportion, harmony, etc." (TV 27, my italics). Passages of this kind imply that beauty just is
(i.e., is identical with) some kind of agreement. Primary or spiritual beauty is
the same thing as benevolence or the consent of being to being, and secondary
beauty is the same thing as symmetry, harmony or proportion, i.e., "uniformity
in the midst of variety" (TV 28).
But there are also serious objections to this interpretation. Edwards often
speaks as if beauty were a property of holiness and hence not the same thing as
holiness. For example, in Religious Affections he speaks of "the loveliness of
the moral excellency of divine things ... the beauty and sweetness of their
moral excellency" (253 f.), "the beauty of their moral excellency," "the beauty
of his holiness," "the beauty of his moral attributes" (256), "the loveliness of
divine things ... viz., ... the beauty of their moral perfection" (271), "the
beauty of the moral perfection of Christ" (273), "the beauty of holiness, or true
moral good" (274), and so on. Edwards also asserts that the unconverted can
see everything that pertains to God's and the saints' moral attributes except their
"beauty and amiableness" (RA 264). Since one can perceive benevolence or
harmony without perceiving (relishing) its beauty, there must be some distinction
between them. Finally, beauty is a simple idea. The consent of (conscious) being
to being, however, is a complex idea composed of the ideas of (conscious) being,
and consent. 9
In short, there is textual evidence for the claim that Edwards identified true
beauty with a spiritual sensation or a tendency to produce it, and also for the
claim that he identified it with consent. Both views seem incompatible with
some of Edwards' other positions. The first seems inconsistent with his belief
that the apprehension of beauty is a "perception" of something existing "without"
the mind while the second is inconsistent with his conviction that beauty is a
simple idea. Can a coherent position be constructed from Edwards' remarks?
Perhaps it can't. He may, however, have been driving at this:
Beauty is identical with benevolence or agreement in somewhat the same way
in which lightning is identical with an electrical discharge or in which materialists
think that consciousness is identical with certain arrangements of matter. (This
accommodates the fact that one can perceive benevolence or agreement without
perceiving its beauty even though its beauty "consists in" benevolence or agreement.) But benevolence is also the "objective" or "physical" basis of a dispositional property, viz., the tendency to produce a new simple idea in those with
converted hearts. The new idea is a delight or pleasure in being's consent to
being which somehow "represents" or is a "perception of' benevolence.
On this interpretation, the idea of true beauty resembles Locke's ideas of
primary and secondary qualities. Spiritual delight is, in Locke's words, a simple
"sensation or perception in our understanding" (Human Understanding II, viii,
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8). The dispositional property is what Locke calls a "quality," i.e., a "power to
produce those ideas in us" (ibid.). Benevolence is the objective configuration
underlying this power. Like simple ideas of primary and secondary qualities,
the new spiritual sensation "represents" or is a "perception" of its object. Just
as "extension" can refer to the idea, the power, or the physical configuration
which is the base of the power, so "beauty" can refer to the sensation, to the
relevant dispositional property, or to benevolence. (My interpretation thus
accounts for the ambiguity of Edwards' remarks.)'o
Edwards' account of spiritual perception may be subject to some of the same
difficulties as Locke's account of sense perception. II Is it, in any way, less
satisfactory than Locke's? It might be in one respect. If my interpretation is
correct, the idea of true beauty is a kind of delight or relish and also an apparent
cognition. Can something be both? It isn't sufficient to argue that perceptions
of objectively real value properties can be inherently affective (and thus pleasurable or painful), for Edwards doesn't think of pleasure and pain in this way.
Pleasures and pains aren't qualities or affective dimensions of more complex
experiences. They are discrete internal sensations. If spiritual pleasure is a kind
of internal delight or thrill, however, it isn't easy to see how it can also be a
true representation of something existing without. Ordinary pleasures and pains
differ from visual or auditory impressions in lacking what Berkeley called "outness"; they don't seem to point beyond themselves. Either spiritual pleasure is
unlike ordinary pleasure in this respect, or it isn't an apparent cognition.
In the next section we will see why Edwards calls the feeling of spiritual pleasure a "perception." Whether this resolves the difficulty, however, is doubtful.

II.
While the spiritual sense is closely connected with a person's will or inclination,12 it is a cognitive faculty-"a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul,
for a new kind of exercises of the ... faculty of understanding" (RA 206, my
italics).13 A sense of the heart involves a person's will or inclination because
"when the mind is sensible" of spiritual beauty "that implies a sensibleness of
sweetness and delight in the presence of the idea of it," "the mind ... relishes
and feels." But "there is [alsoJ the nature of instruction in it"; it is a "kind of
understanding" (RA 272).
Why does Edwards speak of this new cognition as a kind of perception or
sensation? The influence of Locke (and possibly Hutcheson) provides part of
the answer.14
The object of the spiritual sense is a new simple idea, and Edwards shared
Locke's conviction that simple ideas come "from experience" (HU II, i, 2). As
Hutcheson said "Reasoning or intellect seems to raise no new species of ideas
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but [only] to discover or discern the relation of" ideas "received by some
immediate powers of perception internal or external which we may call
sense ... " (Illustrations on the Moral Sense, 135).
Spiritual understanding also involves a kind of relish or delight, and Edwards
follows Locke and Hutcheson in thinking that being pleased or pained, like a
feeling of tactual pressure or being appeared to redly, is a kind of sensation or
perception. (All three believe that pleasure and pain are simple ideas.)
Then again, the new simple idea occurs involuntarily, and Edwards associates
sensation with passivity (Cf. "Subjects to be Handled in the Treatise on the
Mind" 29). This too was a commonplace. For example, Hutcheson said that a
sense is "a determination of the mind to receive any idea from the presence of
an object which occurs to us, independent on our will" (Inquiry, Second Treatise,
1, I).
Finally, the mind's apprehension of true or spiritual beauty is immediate
(non-inferential). "The manner of being affected with the" beauty of a thing
"depends not on any reasonings . . . but on the frame of our minds whereby
they are so made that" as soon as we perceive or cognize it, it "appears beautiful"
(TV 99).15 A comparison with Hutcheson is again instructive, for Hutcheson
argued that the power of receiving the idea of beauty should be called a "sense"
because "we are struck at the first with the beauty" (Inquiry, Second Treatise,
I, XII).
It is thus clear why Edwards speaks of the new cognition as a perception or
sensation. Whether he should have done so is another matter.
There is little force in the third and fourth considerations. Our sensations (and
the beliefs directly based on them) appear involuntary and immediate, but so
does our recognition of the fact that 2+2=4. Passivity and immediacy aren't
peculiar to ideas derived from (internal or external) sensation.
The first two considerations carry more weight. Locke and Hutcheson identify
reason with reasoning. Reason is sharply distinguished from the will and its
affections, and from the senses. Its sole function is to manipulate ideas received
from other sources. Edwards shares these views. 16 Reason doesn't have an affective dimension and doesn't raise new simple ideas. The cognition of true beauty
has an affective dimension, however, since it involves relish or delight. Furthermore, its object is a new simple idea. Spiritual cognition must therefore be some
kind of sensation or perception.
This conclusion seems inconsistent with other aspects of Edwards' position.
A number of Hutcheson's critics took exception to his moral sense theory because
they believed that (1) at least some moral propositions are necessarily true, and
that (2) necessary truths are discerned by reason.17 Hutcheson maintained that
the moral sense grasps the goodness of benevolent actions and dispositions, i.e.,
perceives that benevolence is (morally) good. His critics objected that "Benevo-
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lence is good" is necessarily true, and that necessary truths are apprehended by
reason. It is therefore significant that Edwards himself apparently believed that
moral truths are necessary. 18 Nor is he likely to have thought that the connection
between holiness (benevolent actions and dispositions) and spiritual beauty is
only contingent; that holiness or benevolence might not have been truly beautiful.
But if "Holiness is beautiful" is necessarily true, Edwards seems committed to
the view that our knowledge of at least some necessary truths is derived from a
sense, i.e., that some necessary truths are perceived by a kind of sensation. This
isn't plausible.
One may be able to apprehend the redness of a table without apprehending
that the table is red. But can one apprehend the moral goodness of a benevolent
action without apprehending that the action is morally good, or apprehend its
spiritual beauty without apprehending that it is truly beautiful? The idea of beauty
derives from experience in the sense that one won't acquire the idea if one never
encounters beautiful objects. However, the idea doesn't seem to be a discrete
feeling or sensation which is first received from experience and then incorporated
in a judgment. On the contrary, receiving the idea of beauty appears to be judging
that what one is contemplating is beautiful. Edwards seems committed to claiming
that this judgment is necessarily true. Does it make any sense, then, to speak
of a person's apprehension of a thing's beauty as some kind of internal or external
sensing?
If one were to interpret spiritual cognition as an "intellectual intuition" with
affective overtones, one would avoid this problem as well as the one raised at
the end of the last section. Spiritual "perception" would then be something like
our immediate recognition of the prima facie rightness of an instance of justice
or kindness on a view like W. D. Ross'. Edwards was familiar with at least one
account of this type-John Smith's.
Like Edwards, Smith insisted upon the inadequacy of a merely notional or
intellectual understanding of spiritual things. He, too, thought that divine truths
can only be understood by those who lead holy lives, and he, too, spoke of a
"spiritual sensation." "The soul," said Smith, "itself hath its sense, as well as
the body: and therefore David ... calls not for speculation but sensation, Taste
and see how good the Lord is." Smith's spiritual sensation is an act of "that
reason that is within us . . . [the] eye of the soul . . . our intellectual faculty."
This intellectual intuition or perception of reason incorporates, but isn't identical
with, love and delight. 19 (Smith doesn't find this problematic because he shares
the Platonic view that reason itself has an affective dimension. Knowing the
good involves loving it and delighting in it. 20)
A view like Smith's sidesteps the two problems confronting Edwards-how
a feeling of delight can also be an apparent cognition, and how a necessary truth
can be grasped by a kind of sensation. Edwards' commitment to empiricism

51

THE SENSE OF HEART

precluded this solution. Philosophers like Locke identified reason with ratiocination, and insisted that simple ideas originate in experience (internal or external
sensation). Edwards accepted these theses and therefore couldn't construe
spiritual cognitions as rational intuitions.
III.

While the spiritual sense's direct object is true beauty or excellency, it also
has an indirect object-spiritual facts or truths. There are two cases to consider.
In the first, the spiritual sense enables us to recognize the truth of propositions
that are logically or epistemically related to the excellency of divine things. For
example, our apprehension of Christ's beauty and excellency produces a conviction of His sufficiency as a Mediator (Misc. 782, T 126; RA 273, 302). A
perception of God's beauty and excellency is needed to understand the nature
of His perfections and the works which express them (RA 273, 302). To grasp
the appropriateness of God's end in creation, viz., the communication of His
glory, one must perceive its beauty. Those who appreciate the splendor of God's
glory are the only ones capable of comprehending the fitness of the means He
employs to secure it and thus understanding His wisdom (RA 274, 302). Nor
can one discern "the amiableness of the duties ... that are required of us" unless
one perceives the excellency of divine things (RA 274). One must also see the
excellency of holiness to appreciate the "hatefulness of sin" (RA 274, 301) and
thus be convinced of the justice of divine punishment and our inability to make
satisfaction (RA 302). The spiritual sense, then, enables us to grasp the truth of
a number of important doctrines.
But it also helps us grasp the truth of the gospel scheme as a whole (RA 291
f).21 A conviction of the gospel's truth is an inference from the beauty or excellency
of what it depicts, viz., "God and Jesus Christ ... the work of redemption, and
the ways and works of God ... " (DSL 8). "There is a divine and superlative
glory in these things" which distinguishes "them from all that is earthly and
temporal" (DSL 8). A spiritual person "truly sees" this glory (RA 298). His
perception of it is as immediate and direct as a perception of color or the sweetness
of food (DSL 18), and a conviction of the gospel's truth "is an effect and natural
consequence" (DSL 8). The perception and conviction are nevertheless distinct.
The mind infers the truth and reality of the things contained in the gospel from
its perception of their spiritual beauty. There is, however, no "long chain of
arguments; the argument is but one, and the evidence direct; the mind ascends
to the truth of the gospel but by one step, and that is its divine glory" (RA 298
f. Cf. Misc. 782, T 126).22 Since only one step is involved we can truly say that
the divinity, or reality, or truth of the gospel is "as it were" known intuitively,
that "a soul may have a kind of intuitive knowledge of the divinity [truth, reality]
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of the things exhibited in the gospel" (RA 298).23
The mind's object differs in the two cases. In the first, its object is a fairly
specific doctrinal proposition (like "Christ would be a sufficient mediator") that
is logically or epistemically connected with other propositions which affirm that
some person or characteristic or activity or state of affairs is truly amiable or
beautiful or excellent. Our spiritual sense enables us to perceive the truth of the
latter and from this we infer the truth of the former. In the second, the mind's
object is the content of the gospel as such-what Paul Ricoeur has called "the
world of the text."24 The dominant or controlling or central features of this
world---God, Christ, and the scheme of salvation-are perceived to be truly
beautiful. On the basis of this perception one immediately concludes that the
Biblical world isn't fictional, like the worlds presented in The Brothers
Karamazov or Mohy Dick, but real.
The inference also differs in the two cases. In the first, one infers that a being
as excellent as Christ would he a sufficient mediator, or that the communication
of God's glory ad extra would he an appropriate end for a divine being, or that
eternal punishment would he a fitting punishment for sin. These propositions
could be true even if God didn't exist and the gospel scheme was false. In the
second, one infers that the gospel scheme is true. Only the second case, then,
appears to involve an existential judgment.
Edwards' view has some interesting implications. If my interpretation is correct, the new spiritual sense doesn't involve a direct or immediate or quasi-perceptual awareness of God Himself. Instead, God's reality is inferred from the
excellency and beauty of the things depicted in scripture. As we have seen,
however, the inference "is without any long chain of arguments; the argument
is but one, and the evidence direct .... " Because of the inference's spontaneity
and immediacy, a person can even be said to have "a kind of intuitive knowledge"
of divinity (RA 298). Edwards' interpretation of knowledge of God's reality
thus resembles a familiar account of our knowledge of other minds and physical
objects. While these things aren't directly perceived, their reality or presence is
immediately inferred from sensations or impressions that are directly
apprehended. Edwards thinks our knowledge of God is similar. Although He
isn't directly perceived, God's reality is no more remote or uncertain than other
minds are on his own view, or physical objects on a view like Locke's.
If I am right, Edwards' position differs from a basic beliefs approach. One's
belief in God isn't basic. On the other hand, the inference on which one's belief
is based doesn't involve a long or complicated chain of reasoning, and is as
spontaneous and compelling as our (alleged) inference to other minds or the
reality of the physical world. The redeemed's belief in God is thus similar to
some of Hume's natural beliefs-for example, the belief in the continued existence of unperceived physical objects and (perhaps) the belief in a designer. 25 It
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differs in that the basis of the inference is a new simple idea which God bestows
on the regenerate, and because the inference is sound.
IV.

In the final chapter of The Nature of True Virtue, Edwards attempts to show
that "the frame of mind, or inward sense ... whereby the mind is disposed to
delight in the idea of true virtue," i.e., relish it for its spiritual beauty, isn't
"arbitrary" but agrees "with the necessary nature of things" (TV 99). Since the
"frame of mind" which disposes a person to delight in true beauty (i. e., to be
pleased with benevolence) is benevolence itself, Edwards thinks it will be sufficient to show that benevolence agrees with the nature of things. He employs
four arguments to establish his conclusion.
First Argument:

(I)

A being with understanding and inclinations necessarily desires its
own happiness (i.e., it desires what it wants or desires or finds
agreeable).
(2) Benevolence is the disposition to benefit being in general. Therefore,
(3) A being with understanding and inclinations must approve of benevolence (for it benefits him). (From 1 and 2.) Hence
(4) If a being with understanding and inclinations approves of vice
(i.e., of malevolence or indifference to being in general), then his
attitudes are inconsistent. (From 3.)
(5) Virtue (benevolence) can be approved without inconsistency.
(6) If virtue (benevolence) can be approved without inconsistency and
vice (malevolence or indifference) can't be approved without inconsistency, then virtue agrees with the nature of things and vice
doesn't. Therefore,
(7) Virtue agrees with the nature of things and vice does not. (From
4, 5 and 6.) (TV 101-2)
The argument, if sound, shows that virtue agrees with the nature of things in
the sense that loving virtue is a more rational (i.e., consistent) response to reality
than loving vice.
But the proof isn't persuasive. A person isn't inconsistent in approving and
disapproving (or not approving) of the same thing if he or she approves and
disapproves (or fails to approve) of it in different respects. And this is surely
the case here. The wicked approve of benevolence when it benefits them but
hate it, or are indifferent towards it, when it benefits others. They approve of
(or are indifferent to) malevolence or indifference when directed towards others
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but not when directed towards themselves. These attitudes may be reprehensible
but they aren't inconsistent. Let us therefore tum to Edwards'
Second Argument:
(1)

(2)
(3)

Benevolence is "agreement or consent of being to being."
Being or "general existence" is the nature of things. Therefore,
Benevolence agrees with the nature of things. (TV 100)

Edwards establishes his conclusion by identifying the nature of things with
what is, viz., being in general, and identifying agreement with being's consent
to being.
This too seems unconvincing. The argument only establishes a tautology-that
consent to being (i.e., benevolence) consents to (i.e., agrees with) being (i.e.,
the nature of things). What needs to be shown is that benevolence or consent to
being is an appropriate response to the nature of things, and Edwards' argument
doesn't do this. But, this criticism is somewhat superficial, for it neglects the
argument's theistic context. Edwards believes that being in general is God and
the "particular beings" that depend on Him and manifest His glory. A consent
to, or love of, being in this sense is surely an appropriate response to it. The
theistic metaphysics becomes explicit in Edwards'
Third Argument:
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)
(5)

(6)

God "is in effect being in general." (All being either is God or
unconditionally depends on Him.)
It is "necessary that God should agree with himself, be united with
himself, or love himself." Therefore,
It is necessary that God is benevolent. (From 1 and 2. In loving
Himself, God loves "being in general" and is thus benevolent.)
Consequently,
Benevolence agrees with the nature of God. (From 3.) Now
Whatever agrees with the nature of what "is in effect being in
general" agrees with the nature of things. Therefore,
Benevolence agrees with the nature of things. (From 1, 4 and 5.)
(TV 100)

This argument uses "agreement" in yet another sense. Edwards' point is roughly
that the (ultimate) nature of things is divine benevolence. Human benevolence
agrees with it because it is its image.
Edwards is an occasionalist, an idealist, and a mental phenomenalist. What
are "vulgarly" called causal relations are mere constant conjunctions. True causes
necessitate their effects. Since God's will alone meets this condition, God is the
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only true cause. He is also the only true substance. Physical objects are collections
of "corporeal ideas" (color, figure, solidity, resistance, and so on). Minds are
series of "thoughts" or "perceptions." If a substance underlay perceptions,
thoughts, and corporeal ideas, it would be something that "subsisted by itself,
and stood underneath and kept up" physical and mental properties. But God is
the only thing that subsists by itself, stands underneath, and keeps up thoughts,
perceptions, solidity, color, and other corporeal qualities (ideas). Hence, "the
substance of bodies [and minds] at last becomes either nothing, or nothing but
the Deity acting in that particular manner ... where he thinks fit. "26 The only
real cause and the only real substance is thus God Himself. God's essence,
however, is love. The real nature of things, then, is an infinite and omnipotent
benevolence.
Our benevolence "agrees with" this in the sense that it resembles it or is an
image of it. The thrust of Edwards' argument is therefore this. Benevolence is
appropriate because it mirrors reality. Nature's activity is really God's activity.
Love is thus "natural" in the sense that it imitates the activity of "Nature. "21
Edwards' theistic metaphysics is also implicit in his
Fourth Argument:

Harmony among beings is more agreeable to the nature of things
than disharmony.
(2) Benevolence (the consent of being to being) promotes (or is) harmony among beings. Therefore,
(3) Benevolence agrees with the nature of things. (TV 100-1)

(1)

Edwards assumes that whatever promotes harmony in a system accords or
agrees with its nature. This isn't implausible where the system is organic or
social and, in Edwards' opinion, being in general is an organic or social system.
The only things that exist without qualification are minds, and minds form a
social system in which God is sovereign. 28
Benevolence, then, has a "foundation in the nature of things." Since the
spiritual sense is an expression of benevolence, Edwards concludes that it too
is founded "in the nature of things." 'The idea we obtain by this spiritual sense"
is thus "a knowledge or perception" of something outside our minds, a true
"representation" of something "without," viz., God's moral perfection and excellence and its created reflections (TV 102-3).
Edwards' defense of the objectivity of the new spiritual sense has four steps.
(I) Benevolence agrees with the nature of things. The world is an interconnected
system of minds and ideas in which the only true substance and cause is an
infinite and omnipotent love. Human benevolence is thus an appropriate or fitting
response to reality. (2) Benevolence is pleased by benevolence; it relishes it, or
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delights in it, for its own sake (TV 10-12). Since benevolence is an appropriate
response to reality, so too is benevolence's delight in benevolence. (3) But
delighting in benevolence is identical with perceiving its spiritual beauty. (4)
The redeemed's spiritual perceptions are thus true representations of something
without.
How successful is this defense? The first two steps are plausible. While
Edwards' occasionalism, idealism, and mental phenomenalism undoubtedly
strengthened his belief in benevolence's agreement with the nature of things,
similar conclusions follow from any theistic (or at least Christian) metaphysics.
The second step is also plausible. Furthermore, the fourth step follows from the
third if a "spiritual sensation" is a "representation" of something "without," i.e.,
if it is noetic or "perception-like." Edwards' arguments show that our spiritual
sense is in order, that its motions are appropriate responses to reality. If spiritual
sensations are only subjective feelings, the arguments simply show that they are
appropriate reactions to their objects. If they are noetic, however, the arguments
establish something more. If spiritual sensations are appropriate responses to
reality, and are also apparent cognitions, they are (as Edwards thinks) a "knowledge or perception" of something "without."
The weakest link in the argument is the third. Because Edwards' identification
of spiritual perception with a kind of pleasure is problematic (see sections I and
II), his defense isn't fully successful. Nevertheless, Edwards' reflections provide
a promising start. Benevolence may really be spiritual perception's underlying
mechanism. The nature of this perception, though, and its relation to benevolence,
needs further clarification.
V.

The most instructive feature of Edwards' defense is the way it uses theistic
metaphysics. I suspect that any persuasive justification of a spiritual sense's
reliability will do the same. Is it therefore circular? It isn't if theistic metaphysics
can be established without appealing to spiritual perceptions. Does Edwards
think it can? He believes that theistic metaphysics is supported by natural reason
and sometimes suggests that the rational evidence is sufficient. On the other
hand, he also talks as if it won't habitually seem sufficient to those with unconverted hearts.
If Edwards is right, justifications of spiritual perceptions aren't circular in the
sense that they employ premises which explicitly or implicitly assert that spiritual
perceptions are reliable. Nor are they circular in the sense that they employ
premises which can in principle only be known to be true by those who rely on
their spiritual sense. Nevertheless, there is a psychological or causal connection
between having spiritual perceptions and appreciating the force of the evidence
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for a theistic metaphysics and thereby appreciating the force of justifications of
the spiritual sense's reliability. It seems, then, both that these justifications aren't
logically or epistemically circular and that those who lack spiritual perceptions,
or distrust them, will normally find justifications of this kind unpersuasive.
An example may clarify my point. Suppose that someone sees the force of
an inductive argument for the gUilt of his brother only after he has been persuaded
of his brother's guilt. (Perhaps his brother confessed.) Is the argument circular?
Is it circular for him? Not clearly. The nature of his noetic equipment isn't such
that he can't know the premises without knowing the conclusion. Indeed, he
may have firmly believed that the premises are true. Nor is its nature such that
he can't see that the premises establish the conclusion. The fault isn't with his
noetic equipment but with his attachment to his brother which blinded him to
the force of the evidence and prevented him from using his noetic equipment
properly. The relation between believing the conclusion and recognizing the
force of the argument for it is thus extrinsic or accidental-the result of a
psychological aberration rather than a matter of logic or the nature of his cognitive
faculties.
I think Edwards' view is similar. The reliability of our spiritual sense can be
justified by a theistic metaphysics which is itself adequately supported by evidence
accessible to natural reason. But sin blinds us to the evidence's force. There is
thus a causal connection between spiritual perception and rational persuasion.
Appeals to spiritual perceptions play no role, however, in the justificatory process
itself. If this is correct, it seems misleading to say that the reliability of the
spiritual sense can't be justified without circularity.
VI.
Does Edwards contribute anything to current discussions? I think he does.
Edwards describes cases in which a person's belief in God is spontaneous,
psychologically immediate, directly rooted in his or her experience but nonetheless inferential. These beliefs have been neglected in recent discussions. I think
they occur, and suspect that at least some cases in which a believer claims to
perceive God or God's activity are more aptly described in this fashion. That
is, I think there is an interesting set of cases in which a person's belief in God
is neither basic nor perceptual although it has a number of the phenomenological
features that Alvin Plantinga and William Alston attribute to it. '"
Another gap in contemporary discussions is a failure to adequately explain
how theistic belief producing mechanisms operate. The issue is important for
two reasons.
First, the nature of the mechanism has a bearing on its reliability. For example,
Freud offers several accounts of the nature of the theistic belief producing
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mechanism which, if true, cast doubt on its reliability. Theists can defuse criticisms of this sort by providing alternative and equally plausible accounts of the
mechanism's operation that don't impugn its reliability.
The second reason is this. On reading the Vedas, an Advaitin may find himself
spontaneously believing that they express the Nirguna Brahman. On reading the
/Sa Upanishad or having a monistic mystical experience, he may find himself
spontaneously believing that all differences are unreal or that the impersonal
Brahman is ultimate. If these beliefs are true, theism is false. On the face of it,
the theist's beliefs and the Advaitin's beliefs are formed in similar ways. The
same sort of belief producing mechanism seems involved in both cases. If it is,
then if one is reliable, so presumably is the other. And yet they can't both be
reliable, for they produce conflicting beliefs. Hence, neither seems reliable.
What is needed is an explanation of the difference between theistic and (for
example) Advaitin belief producing mechanisms together with an indication of
why the former is reliable and the latter isn't.
Edwards may provide some assistance here for he has the beginnings of an
account of how one theistic belief producing mechanism operates. His account
is also the right sort. If the mechanism is (a function of?) benevolence rather
than wish fulfillment or the working out of an Oedipal complex, there may be
less reason for thinking it untrustworthy. Again, if the disposition to form true
religious beliefs is a function of benevolence or love, if benevolence or love
agrees with the nature of things, and if benevolence is either absent or less fully
developed in Advaita, one has some indication of why the theist's religious belief
producing mechanism is more reliable than the Advaitin' s. 30
My point, of course, is not that Edwards has provided a fully adequate account
but that some account is needed to defuse a certain sort of criticism, and that
the kind of account Edwards presents is the right kind.
Finally, Edwards' remarks bear on the claim that justifications of the reliability
of spiritual experience are inevitably circular. The claim is plausible partly
because those who lack spiritual experience or doubt its reliability so often find
these justifications unpersuasive. If I am correct, a position like Edwards' can
accommodate this fact without conceding that arguments for the reliability of
spiritual experience are circular in a philosophically significant sense.
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

NOTES
1. Edwards' discussions of the sense of the heart are located in The Nature of True Virtue (Ann
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Arbor, 1970), Religious Affections (New Haven, 1959), and the "Miscellanies" (a number of which
can be found in The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards from his Private Notebooks, ed. by Harvey
G. Townsend [Eugene, Oregon, 1955]). For other relevant material see A Faithful Narrative of the
Surprising Work of God, in the Conversion of Many Hundred Souls . .. ,The Distinguishing Marks
of a Work of the Spirit of God (both in The Great Awakening, ed. by C. C. Goen [New Haven,
1972]), "A Divine and Supernatural light" (The Works of President Edwards; 1968 reprint of the
Leeds edition reissued with a two volume supplement in Edinburgh 1847, Vol. VIII), and "Personal
Narrative" (Jonathan Edwards: Representative Selections, ed. by Clarence H. Faust and Thomas
H. Johnson [New York, 1935]), and 'The Mind" (Scientific and Philosophical Writings, ed. by
Wallace E. Anderson [New Haven, 1980]).
2. Edwards believes that the immediate objects of mental acts are ideas. Like Berkeley, he tends
to conflate ideas and their contents (what the ideas are ideas oj).
3. Why regard these as objects of a sense or feeling of the heart? Presumably because (for example)
a perception of beauty or importance, involves a perception of the non-evaluative features upon
which beauty or importance depend, or because one can't fully grasp or understand these non-evaluative properties without perceiving their beauty or importance, or both.
4. Edwards clearly thinks that there are qualitative differences between pleasures. The pleasure
which the natural man takes in secondary beauty (i.e., in "regularity, order, uniformity, symmetry,
proportion, harmony, etc." (TV 28) is qualitatively different from the spiritual person's delight in
holiness.
5. This isn't absolutely decisive. On Locke's view, "red" can be used not only to refer to a simple
sensation but also to a power of producing this sensation that certain objects possess in virtue of
their primary qualities, i.e., "red" can be used to express a mixed mode as well as a simple idea.
I will argue that Edwards' use of "beauty" exhibits a similar ambiguity. Nevertheless, it is reasonably
clear that Locke believed that, in its primary sense, "red" denotes a simple idea, and that Edwards
thought the same of "beauty."
6. See Locke, Human Understanding II, viii. Cf. Hutcheson who says that moral approbation,
i.e., the disinterested delight in morally good actions and dispositions, "cannot be supposed an image
of anything external, more than the pleasures of harmony, of taste, of smell." (Illustrations on the
Moral Sense [Cambridge, Mass., 1971], p. 164).
7. This point is inconclusive, however, since Edwards sometimes departs from Locke. For example,
he asserts that beauty is a simple idea although Locke thought it was amixed mode (HU II, xii, 51).
8. Edwards was influenced by Henry More (who self-consciously combined Platonism and Cartesianism). He was also familiar with Ralph Cudworth and John Smith, and quotes both with approval.
9. Of course, Edwards might have believed that the relevant relational terms ("consents," "is equal
to," "agrees with," "harmonizes with," etc.) stand for simple ideas, but he never says this, and
while Locke thinks that the ideas of relations "terminate in simple ideas" (arise from the comparison
of simple ideas) he doesn't seem to think that relations themselves are simple ideas (HU II, xxv,
9-10; II, xxviii, 18-20).
10. Does the idea of beauty not only "represent" but also "resemble" its object, as Locke's ideas of
extension, figure and motion "resemble" the objective configurations that cause them? Edwards
never explicitly says it does. (That the idea is a "perception" of "something without" only distinguishes
it from ideas of tertiary qualities.) In calling it "knowledge," however, and in insisting that we can
have no true idea of its objects without it, Edwards implies that the idea accurately represents (some
aspect of) its object. This suggests that the idea of beauty should be assimilated to Locke's ideas of
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primary qual ities.
II. It isn't clear that the mind's immediate objects arc ideas. It isn't clear how they represent or
resemble their objects. And so on.
12. At one point, Edwards asks "concerning speculative understanding and sense of heart; whether
any difference between the sense of the heart and the will or inclination ... " ("Subjects to be
handled in the Treatise on the Mind" 14).
13. Cf. RA 275. It involves a new "sort of understanding or knowledge . .. [viz.] that knowledge
of divine things from whence all truly gracious affections do proceed ... " (my italics).
14. Locke was a major influence. Hutcheson's Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and
Virtue is referred to in Edwards' "Catalogue of Books" on p. 8 and p. 22. On p. 22, Edwards writes
"Hutcheson's Essay on the Passions cited in his Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty
and Virtue," which implies that he had read the Inquiry by that time. (Thomas H. Johnson ["Jonathan
Edwards' Background of Reading," Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, XXVIII
(1930-33), 194-222] estimates that pages 15-43 date from 1746 to 1757.) Hutcheson is mentioned
three times in True Virtue, and quotations from the Inquiry occur in Original Sin on pages 225 and
226. Hutcheson's An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections and Illustrations
on the Moral Sense (two essays) appeared in 1728 (three years after the first edition of the Inquiry).
This work is entered in the "Catalogue" on pages 22 and 32. In the "Book of Controversies," the
"Nature and Conduct of the Passions is quoted, and this passage is incorporated into Original Sin
but credited to Turnbull" (Clyde A. Holbrook, OS [introd.], 741). The implication is that Edwards
was familiar with the two essays. Whatever he was significantly influenced by Hutcheson, though,
is unclear. I shall argue that Edwards' sympathy with the empiricists is sufficient to explain why he
thinks of spiritual cognition as a kind of sensing. The idea of a spiritual sense was, however, a
Puritan commonplace. For example, John Owen said that God "gives ... a spirituall sense, a Tast
of the things themselves upon the mind, Heart and Conscience." According to Richard Sibbes, "It
is knowledge with a tast .. . God giveth knowledge per modum gustus." Francis Rous said that
"After we have tasted those heavenly things. . from this taste there ariseth anew, but a true,
lively, and experimental knowledge of the things so tasted .... For even in natural fruits there are
certain relishes. . which nothing but the taste it self can tnlly represent and shew unto us. The
West-Indian Piney [pineapple] cannot be so expressed in words, even by him that hath tasted it,
that he can deliver over the true shape and character of that taste to another that hath not tasted it."
(The quotations are from Geoffrey F. Nuttall, The Holy Spirit in Puritan Faith and Experience, 2nd
ed., Oxford, 1947, pp. 39 and 139.) Edwards was indebted to his predecessors for the idea of a
spiritual sensation. His development of that concept, however, is heavily influenced by empiricists
like Locke.
15. Cf. Religious Affections, 281f where Edwards speaks of the immediacy with which this new
sense judges of the spiritual beauty of actions, or The Nature of True Virtue 98-9.
16. "If we take reason strictly-not for the faculty of mental perception in general [which would
include sense perception], but for ratiocination ... the perceiving of spiritual beauty and excellency
no more belongs to reason, than it belongs to the sense of feeling to perceive colors.
. Reason's
work is to perceive truth and not excellency" (DSL 18).
17. See, for example, the correspondence between Hutcheson and Gilbert Burnet.
18. Edwards clearly thinks that at least some moral truths are necessary. (See Freedom of the Will
(New Haven, 1957), p. 153. Edwards' example is "It is ... fit and suitable, that men should do
to others, as they would that they should do to them.") It is worth observing that Locke, too, thinks
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that moral truths are necessary. (Human Understanding III, xi, 15-18; IV, iii, 18-20; and IV, iv, 7-10.)
19. The quotations are from Smith's "Of the True Way or Method of Attaining to Divine Knowledge,"
Select Discourses (New York, 1978). (I have modernized the capitalization and spelling.) In his
introduction to Religious Affections, John E. Smith denies that Smith's spiritual sensation is an
intellectual intuition (RA 66). Quotations like the last, however, and the Platonic tenor of the
discourse as a whole, seem to support my interpretation.
20. "Intellectual life, as they [the Platonists] phrase it" is a nondiscursive "knowledge ... [that] is
always pregnant with divine virtue, which ariseth out of a happy union of souls with God, and is
nothing else but a living imitation of a Godlike perfection drawn out by a strong fervent love of it.
This divine knowledge ... makes us amorous of divine beauty, ... and this divine love and purity,
reciprocally exalts divine knowledge ... " (Select Discourses, p. 20.)
21. This was not, of course, a new idea. Thus, Richard Sibbes said "God ... causeth him to see
a divine majesty shining forth in the scriptures, so that there must be an infused establishing by the
Spirit to settle the heart in this first principle ... that the Scriptures are the word of God." Or again,
"How do you know the word to be the word? It carrieth proof and evidence in itself. It is an evidence
that the fire is hot to him that feeleth it, and that the sun shineth to him that looks on it; how much
more doth the word ... I am sure I felt it, it warmed my heart, and converted me." (Quoted in
Nuttall, op. cit., pp. 23 and 39.)
22. Presumably the argument is:
(1) Gospel doctrines exhibit a divine excellency or beauty. Therefore,

(2) Gospel doctrines are true.
2 follows from 1 if doctrines that exhibit this supernatural radiance or splendor must have a supernatural
author. (On this point see DSL 10, Misc. 256 [T 249], and Misc. 782 [T 126].) How is this
generalization related to the argument? If the inference involves only one step, it can't be functioning
as a premise. Perhaps, then, the generalization is an inference rule. Or perhaps Edwards thinks of
it as a necessary truth. (If it is, then 1 immediately entails 2.) Or perhaps it is simply an inductive
generalization from a set of "natural inferences"-judgments that the redeemed find themselves
spontaneously making in the presence of the gospel, and which are trustworthy given that their new
faculties are God-given. (If the third alternative is correct, the generalization plays no role in the
argument.)
23. A superficial reading of some passages might suggest, that Edwards thinks our knowledge of
divine reality is immediate. Thus Miscellanies 201 (T 246f) and 408 (T 249f) assert that ideas which
are clear and lively, and cohere with each other and with other ideas, are quite properly regarded
as real or true. Those with converted hearts find the ideas of religion (scripture) clear, lively,
internally coherent, and in harmony with their other ideas. They, therefore, quite properly take them
to be real or true. But this "appearing real ... cannot be drawn out into formal arguments." It
depends upon "ten thousand little relations and mutual agreements that are ineffable," "and is a sort
of seeing rather than reasoning the truth of religion." But Edwards isn't clearly denying that the
conviction of reality is inferential. (He may simply be insisting on its psychological immediacy and
coerciveness, and the fact that it doesn't rest on formal arguments.) In any case, his normal view
is that presented in "Divine and Supernatural Light" and Religious Affections, viz., that the reality
of divine things is inferred by one step from their spiritual beauty and excellency. Nor is my
interpretation adversely affected by Edwards' discussions of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. In
both Religious Affections and the Treatise on Grace (Cambridge, 1971), Edwards argues that "grace
in the heart. . is no other than the Spirit of God itself dwelling and acting in the heart of a
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saint. ." (TG 70). The "principle in them" is "no other than the spirit of God itself, united to the
soul, and living and acting in it, and exerting itself in the use and improvement of its faculties" (TG
71). The saints thus "partake of that holiness by which He himself is holy" (TG 73, cf. RA I 97ff).
It would be a mistake, however, to infer that a perception of God's gracious influence is (literally)
a perception of God Himself. What one seems immediately aware of in this case are one's new holy
dispositions and affections and their spiritual beauty. These are indeed images of "the excellencies
and beauties of God and Christ" (Misc. 239, T 248), and a consequence of God's immediate action
on the soul (TG 53, DSL 17), but they aren't God Himself.
24. "Philosophy and Religious Language," The Journal of Religion 54 (1974), 71-85.
25. Cf., e.g., Ronald J. Butler, "Natural Belief and the Enigma of Hume," Archiv Fur Geschichte
de Philosophie 42 (1960), 73-100 or John Hick, "A New Form of Theistic Argument," Proceedings
of the XIV International Congress of Philosophy V (1970), 336-41. But also see (e.g.) J. C. A.
Gaskin, Hume's Philosophy of Religion (London, 1978), chap. 8.
26. "Of Atoms" (Scientific and Philosophical Writings, p. 215). The quotations are from an argument
"proving" that God is the only substance underlying corporeal properties. Edwards clearly thinks,
however, that similar considerations show that God is also the only substance underlying mental
qualities.
27. Since God is (according to Edwards) the only true substance and the only true cause, there is
a real sense in which He is natura naturans.
28. Edwards also thinks that God (who is "in effect being in general") is triune and thus inherently
social.
29. See for example, Alston's "Religious Experience and Religious Belief," Nous XVI (1982), pp.
3-12, or "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," in Faith and Rationality, ed. by Alvin Plantinga
and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, Indiana: 1983). Or see Plantinga's "Is Belief in God Properly
Basic?" Nous XV (1981), or "Reason and Belief in God," in Faith and Rationality, op. cit.
30. It will be more difficult for a Christian to cast aspersions on (e.g.) a Vaisnava's religious belief
producing mechanism. Vaisnavism is a theistic grace religion that values love. To discriminate
between the Christian's and the Vaisnava's intuitions, one must either (1) distinguish between the
quality of the Christian's and the Vaisnava's benevolence, or (2) appeal to cultural, or (less plausibly)
psychological or moral, factors that impede the proper operations of the Vaisnava's spiritual faculties.
The Christian might, however, concede that some true beauty is perceived in the Bhagavad-Gitii
and the theistic Upanishads. For he or she may think that these texts, too, are revelations though
not as perfect as the Christian revelation. (Cf. Clement of Alexander's claim that philosophy may
have been "given to the Greeks directly; for it was a 'schoolmaster,' to bring Hellenism to Christ,
as the Law was for the Hebrews." [Henry Bettenson, The Early Christian Fathers, London, 1963,
p. 232.])

